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Satellite communicationAbstract Automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) systems can broadcast satellite-
based aircraft position, identiﬁcation, etc., periodically, and are now on track to replace radar to
become the backbone of next-generation air trafﬁc management (ATM) systems. However,
ADS-B systems suffer severe cyber-security problems due to the broadcast-type data link and the
lack of designed-in security measures. Especially, since ADS-B messages are unauthenticated, it
is easy to insert fake aircraft into a system via spooﬁng or insertion of false messages. Unfortu-
nately, the authentication for ADS-B messages has not yet been well studied. In this paper, based
on identity-based signature with message recovery (IBS-MR), an efﬁcient broadcast authentication
scheme for ADS-B messages is proposed. The security analysis demonstrates that the scheme can
achieve authenticity and integrity of ADS-B broadcast messages, as well as adaptive evolution of
broadcasters’ private keys. The performance evaluation shows that the scheme is computationally
efﬁcient for typical avionics devices with limited resources. Furthermore, the scheme achieves low
communication overhead since broadcast messages can be recovered from signatures, and thus it is
suitable for low-bandwidth ADS-B data link.
ª 2014 Production and hosting by Elsevier Ltd. on behalf of CSAA & BUAA.1. Introduction
With the development of space communications and Internet,
traditional aging civil aviation systems are evolving into
e-enabled systems with advanced wireless technologies to
operate as an intelligent mobile node in a global information
network of systems in space, air, and ground.1 Global position
systems (GPS), ADS-B systems, and wireless networking are
major backbones of future e-enabled aircraft. Furthermore,
advances in satellites and terrestrial data links promise
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off-board systems on Internet for airline operations and
in-ﬂight entertainment.
Specially, ADS-B systems allow broadcasting satellite-
based aircraft position, identiﬁcation, capability, and intent
to other aircraft and ground stations periodically.2 Therefore,
ADS-B-equipped aircraft can have a common situational
awareness picture, which is very important because decisions
can be made with a full awareness of impact to other users.
As a result, ADS-B systems have been implemented in many
countries and are on track to replace radar and become the
backbone of next-generation ATM systems. For example,
the federal aviation administration (FAA) mandates aircraft
to be ADS-B ready by 2020 in the USA.3 Shift from radar
to ADS-B surveillance is highly likely in China.4
However, potential cyber-security vulnerabilities in ADS-B
systems remain to be assessed and resolved. As known, ADS-B
data link is a broadcast-type link which is done without
designed-in cyber-security measures. Therefore, the most
fundamental security issue is that ADS-B messages are unau-
thenticated, and thus it is easy to insert false aircraft into an
ADS-B system by transmitting signals on ADS-B frequencies.5
As a result, ADS-B data spooﬁng is a severe potential threat to
safety of air trafﬁc and it is considered as the most serious
obstacle for the popularization of ADS-B systems.
Although the spooﬁng threat can be mitigated with the
multilateration technique, which can identify a target by
using ground stations that detect transmissions from the tar-
get, an airplane receiving ADS-B data has no way to do that.
In other words, an ADS-B-In receiver on an aircraft cannot
tell whether the received ADS-B signals transmitted on
ADS-B frequencies are either from legal aircraft or from
spoofed ones.
The potential and possible approaches against ADS-B data
spooﬁng may be cryptographic technologies. However, simply
using encryption to prevent ADS-B data spooﬁng is not appli-
cable, because the encrypted messages could not be decoded
correctly by the public, and thus this would violate the original
openness intention of ADS-B system design. As known,
encryption changes messages, while authentication does not
change messages (only append authentication data, e.g., digital
signatures). Hence, authentication is naturally introduced to
prevent ADS-B data from being spoofed. The key beneﬁt is
that whether you are checking authentication or not, the
broadcast messages can be seen by all participants and thus
the fundamental openness of ADS-B systems is maintained.
Despite the importance, authentication for ADS-B broad-
cast messages has not been well studied in general aviation
due to the complexity and unique properties of aviation
communications.
In this paper, based on IBS-MR, we propose an efﬁcient
broadcast authentication scheme for ADS-B messages in gen-
eral aviation, named EBAA. Speciﬁcally, the contributions of
this paper are twofold.
(1) Firstly, EBAA can achieve authenticity and integrity for
ADS-B broadcast messages. This is due to the security
of the underlined IBS-MR crypto-primitive. We prove
that the signature for a broadcast message is consistent,
and existentially unforgeable under a chosen message
attack. In addition, EBAA can achieve adaptive
evolution of broadcasters’ private keys.(2) Secondly, EBAA is computationally efﬁcient for typical
avionics devices with limited resources, mainly since the
veriﬁcation of the signature needs only one costly
pairing operation. Moreover, EBAA has low communi-
cation overhead where the message can be recovered
from the signature, and thus the total transmission
length is small. Therefore, it is suitable for low-
bandwidth ADS-B data link.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 reviews related works. We formalize models and security
requirements in Section 3. In Section 4, we review preliminar-
ies. Then, we propose a broadcast authentication scheme for
ADS-B messages based on IBS-MR in Section 5, followed
by security analysis and performance evaluation in Section 6
and Section 7, respectively. Finally, we draw our conclusions
in Section 8.2. Related works
To protect integrity and authenticity of ADS-B broadcast mes-
sages, cryptography can be used in ADS-B communications.
Although TESLA6 is widely known as a lightweight broadcast
authentication scheme, it cannot be directly applied to aviation
problems due to unique properties of aviation communica-
tions. For example, TESLA may not play well for authenticity
of emergent broadcast messages due to the heavy dependence
on time delay. Recently, Sampigethaya et al.1 ﬁrst considered
possible cryptographic solutions for ADS-B messages authen-
tication, either by symmetric-key encryptions or by digital sig-
natures. Following their ideas, two authentication schemes
were proposed respectively. At CSQRWC 2012, Chen et al.7
proposed a data link authenticated encryption scheme based
on symmetric block ciphers. However, the obvious difﬁculty
in this scheme is the distribution of symmetric keys, since
ADS-B data link is not well-connected and thus the keys
cannot be well distributed in real time, which limits the use
of symmetric cryptography. In addition, the encryption of
ADS-B messages conﬂicts with the intended use of ADS-B that
assumes open availability of position information in ATM
systems. Also in 2012, Pan et al.8 provided an ADS-B data
authentication scheme based on an elliptic curve data signature
algorithm (ECDSA) and X.509 certiﬁcates. However, the
traditional certiﬁcate-based signature involves complex con-
struction of certiﬁcate authority (CA), consequently requiring
expensive communication and computation costs for certiﬁ-
cate veriﬁcation, and thus it is not suitable for low-bandwidth
ADS-B data link.
IBS-MR9 provides an alternative solution for efﬁcient
authentication of ADS-B messages. On one hand, identity-
based signature (IBS) can simplify key management proce-
dures of traditional certiﬁcate-based signature.10 The idea
behind IBS is that a user’s public key can be directly derived
from the identity string, and thus CA is not necessary, but such
a system needs a trusted authority called private key generator
(PKG) whose task is to extract the user’s private key from the
user’s identity information. On the other hand, a signature
with message recovery provides the feature that the message
is recoverable from the signature, hence it does not need to
be transmitted separately, and the total length of the message
and the appended signature can be reduced.11 As a result,
690 H. Yang et al.IBS-MR is appropriately used for ADS-B communication
where the bandwidth of the data link is low.
Several practical IBS schemes12–14 have been proposed
since 1984,10 but no IBS-MR scheme has been presented until
the scheme proposed by Zhang et al. in 2005 (ZSM scheme, for
short).9 However, the veriﬁcation in the ZSM scheme needs
two costly bilinear paring computations. Additionally, the
ZSM scheme is not designed especially for ADS-B broadcast
authentication. Thus, it motivates us to design an efﬁcient
broadcast authentication scheme for ADS-B messages based
on IBS-MR.
3. Models and design requirements
In this section, we formalize the system and adversary models,
and identify design requirements of ADS-B broadcast
authentication.
3.1. System model
As shown in Fig. 1, the system model consists of aircraft and
ADS-B ground stations. Each aircraft is equipped with
advanced positioning units, e.g., GPS, to compute accurate
spatial information, i.e., position, time, velocity, heading, etc.
Aircraft move in airspace, sharing information as well as com-
municating with air trafﬁc control centers. Moreover, aircraft
periodically broadcast trafﬁc beacons, once or twice per sec-
ond, using their ADS-B-Out capability. Ground controllers
and aircraft of one communication hop away and utilize the
ADS-B-In capability for ground surveillance and airborne sur-
veillance. On the other hand, ADS-B data link standards
mainly include a universal access transceiver (UAT)15 and a
1090 MHz extended squitter (1090 ES),16 both with a transmis-
sion range of 100 miles or longer. In addition, each aircraft
possesses a globally coordinated permanent unique digital
identiﬁer, such as the 24-bit international civil aviation organi-
zation (ICAO) address.Fig. 1 System model.3.2. Adversary model
ADS-B data link is a broadcast-type link which is done ‘‘in
the clear.’’ Hence, it would open a door for an adversary to
attack speciﬁc aircraft in all kinds of ways. McCallie et al.17
outlined six key ways of attacks that could harm ADS-B
systems, ranging from relatively easy disruptions using jam-
ming equipment to more difﬁcult target ghost inject (spoof-
ing) to ﬂood denial. This paper mainly focuses on how to
provide broadcast authentication for ADS-B messages.
Therefore, we do not consider passive eavesdropping and
recording all broadcast messages. Furthermore, we consider
communication jamming threats not to directly threaten
authenticity. This paper considers an adversary to be an
entity external to a system. The adversary is capable of
launching active adversarial threats to authenticity and
integrity such as spooﬁng false aircraft or corruption of traf-
ﬁc data.
In addition, side-channel attacks pose signiﬁcant threats to
ADS-B space communications by exploiting various forms of
unintended sensitive information leakage (e.g., electromagnetic
radiation), especially considering that the exposure of the pri-
vate key in cryptographic schemes (e.g., digital signature) is the
greatest harm to users and means that all security goals are
entirely lost. In this paper, the key evolving technique is
adopted to reduce damage caused by private key exposure.
3.3. Requirements on broadcast authentication
For broadcast authentication of ADS-B messages, we consider
the following security requirements needed to be satisﬁed.
Firstly, to cope with active adversarial threats such as
spooﬁng false targets or corruption of trafﬁc data, authentic-
ity and integrity of ADS-B broadcast messages should be
preserved, i.e., transmitted messages are really sent by legit-
imate ADS-B-equipped aircraft or ground stations, and have
not been forged or modiﬁed during the communication.
Note that in EBAA, authentication for ADS-B messages is
implemented with IBS-MR, therefore the underlined signa-
tures for the broadcast messages are required to be consis-
tent and existentially unforgeable under chosen-message
attacks.
Secondly, to preserve resilience to key leakage, key indepen-
dence should be satisﬁed, which is achieved by broadcasters’
key evolving technique, i.e., if an adversary compromises a pri-
vate key, any previous and future keys will not be affected.
Thirdly, the bandwidth cost of authentication should be as
small as possible in ADS-B data link communication. There
are two reasons as follows. On one hand, each aircraft period-
ically broadcasts trafﬁc beacons at a very high frequency, once
or twice per second. On the other hand, the available ADS-B-
Out data space is small and limited in various ADS-B imple-
mentation technologies. For example, considering the typical
data block size of payload in a UAT, there are only 272 bits
of data space left, in which with the 32-bit header (HDR) there
is only 240-bit data space that can be used as the payload.15
For a 1090 ES, besides the occupation of the aircraft location
and other necessary information, only 56 bits of message ﬁeld
may be used.16
Finally, the computation cost should be small since avionics
devices are usually resource-constrained.
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In this section, we introduce the notations in Table 1 used
throughout the remainder of this paper and review the bilinear
maps and UAT ADS-B message structures.
4.1. Bilinear maps
We brieﬂy review bilinear maps as in Ref.18. Let G1 and G2
be two additive groups, and GT be a multiplicative group of
the same prime order q. Let P be a generator of G1, Q be a
generator of G2, and w be an efﬁciently computable isomor-
phism from G2 to G1, with w(Q) = P. An admissible bilin-
ear map is a map eˆ:G1 · G2ﬁ GT with the following
properties:
(1) Bilinearity: for all U 2 G1, V 2 G2, and a,b 2 Zq*,
eˆ(aU,bV) = eˆ(U,V)ab.
(2) Non-degeneracy: eˆ(P,Q) „ 1.
(3) Computability: eˆ can be computed efﬁciently. Note
that for simplicity, one can set G1 = G2. However, in
EBAA, we set G1 „ G2 to take advantage of certain
families of elliptic curves to obtain more efﬁcient
implementation.
Deﬁnition 1. An asymmetric bilinear parameter generator GðkÞ
is a probabilistic algorithm that takes a security parameter
k 2 Z+ as input, and outputs a 7-tuple (q, P, Q, G1, G2, GT, eˆ)
where q is a k-bit prime number, G1, G2, and GT are three cyclic
groups of the same order q with G1 „ G2, P is a generator of G2,
Q is a generator of G2, and eˆ: G1 · G2ﬁ GT is an admissible
bilinear map.
Deﬁnition 2. The co-DH (co-Difﬁe-Hellman) problem is: given
Q,aQ 2 G2 and P 2 G1 as inputs for unknown a 2 Zq*, com-
pute aP.
Deﬁnition 3. The co-DHI (co-Difﬁe-Hellman inversion) prob-
lem is: given Q,aQ 2 G2 and P 2 G1 as inputs for unknown
a 2 Zq*, compute a1P.Table 1 Notations.
Notation Meaning
½k1 The most signiﬁcant k1 bits of a message
½k2 The least signiﬁcant k2 bits of a message
|Æ| The bit length of a message
¯ XOR computation in the binary system
|| Concatenation operator
G1, G2, GT Three groups of the same order
q, |q| = k1 + k2
eˆ: G1 · G2ﬁ GT An admissible bilinear map
Z+ The set of positive integers
Zq
* The group {0,1,. . .,q1}
under addition modulo q
H1: {0,1}
*ﬁ Zq* A cryptographic one-way hash function
H2: GTﬁ Zq* A cryptographic one-way hash function
F1: f0; 1gk2 ﬁ f0; 1gk1 A cryptographic one-way hash function
F2: f0; 1gk1 ﬁ f0; 1gk2 A cryptographic one-way hash functionNote that from Mitsunari et al.,19 co-DH and co-DHI are
polynomial-time equivalent.4.2. UAT ADS-B message structures
This subsection gives a brief overview of UAT ADS-B message
structures,15 which provides a conceptual illustration of the
payload structures of two deﬁned types of UAT ADS-B mes-
sages, namely the basic ADS-B message and the long ADS-B
messages. All UAT ADS-B messages incorporate a message
HDR, which provides one means to correlate different mes-
sages received from a given aircraft. The HDR also contains
a 5-bit ﬁeld (among other data) to indicate the type of informa-
tion provided in the message. This enables designation of up to
32 different payload types (labeled from 0 to 31), which are
shown parenthetically in Fig. 2. Note that in our scheme, we
use the ADS-B message of Type 30.
5. Proposed scheme: EBAA
In this section, we propose a broadcast authentication scheme
for ADS-B messages based on IBS-MR: EBAA. EBAA
consists of the following ﬁve phases: system initialization,
broadcaster registration, messages signing and broadcast,
veriﬁcation and recovery, and private key evolution.
5.1. Main ideas
The main ideas of EBAA are shown in Fig. 3. A broadcaster
attaches an IBS signature to every piece of an ADS-B message
by use of its private key. This allows recipients to easily verify
integrity and authenticity of received messages. As such, any
falsiﬁcation or corruption can be detected. On the other hand,
common digital signature schemes require heavy computation
and high communication cost, and thus could be thought of as
not being suitable for ADS-B message authentication.
However, by use of the efﬁcient IBS-MR, lightweight compu-
tation is achieved (one pairing operation for veriﬁcation) in
EBAA. Furthermore, in addition to bandwidth saving in key
distribution due to the identity-based setting, recovering
messages from signatures reduces the total length for messages
and signatures, and thus the communication cost decreases
greatly. Finally, EBAA preserves resilience to key leakage
utilizing the technique of private key evolving.Fig. 2 UAT ADS-B message structures.
Fig. 3 Main ideas of EBAA.
692 H. Yang et al.5.2. System initialization
The air trafﬁc controller can act as PKG to set up all param-
eters as follows.
Step 1. Given the security parameter k, run GðkÞ to generate
a 7-tuple (q, P, Q, G1, G2, GT, eˆ).
Step 2. Choose a random number s2Zq*, keep it as the sys-
tem master key secretly, and compute Qpub = sQ and
g= eˆ(P,Q).
Step 3. Choose four secure cryptographic one-way hash
functions H1: {0,1}
*ﬁ Zq*; H2: GTﬁ Zq*;F1: f0; 1gk2 ﬁ
f0; 1gk1 , and F2: f0; 1gk1 ﬁ f0; 1gk2 , where |q| = k1 + k2.
Step 4. Publish the public parameters asfq;P;Q;G1;G2;GT; e^;Qpub; g;H1;H2;F1;F2g ð1Þ5.3. Broadcaster registration
When broadcaster B registers its identity IDB to the system,
PKG works as follows.
Step 1. Check if IDB is valid.
Step 2. Compute the private key SKIDB of IDB asSKIDB ¼ ðsþH1ðIDBÞÞ1P ð2Þ
Step 3. Send SKIDB to B through a secure channel.Remark 1. Assume that a secure channel for transmitting
private keys can be properly established via additional
cryptographic tools such as wired or wireless SSL (secure
socket layer) protocols, as suggested in Ref.205.4. Message signing and broadcast
A broadcaster with the private key SKIDB signs a message
m 2 f0; 1gk2 and broadcasts it as follows.
Step 1. Choose a random l 2 Zq* and computev ¼ gl ð3Þ
Step 2. To recover the message from its signature later, setf ¼ F1ðmÞ ðF2ðF1ðmÞÞk mÞ ð4Þ
Step 3. Generate a signature (r,U) of m asr ¼ H2ðvÞ þ f ðmod qÞ; U ¼ ð1þ rlÞSKIDB ð5Þ
Step 4. Broadcast the signature (r,U) through ADS-B data
link.Remark 2. The length of the signature is |r+U| = |q|+|G1|.
This signature can be used to recover the message m, where
|m| = k2. In addition, to prevent replay attack, a timestamp
can be appended into the message m as common. Here we omit
the details.5.5. Veriﬁcation and recovery
Upon the receipt of (r,U), each recipient veriﬁes the signature
and recovers the message as follows.
Step 1. ComputeV ¼ Qpub þH1ðIDBÞQ ð6Þ
Step 2. Computef ¼ rH2 e^ðU;VÞr
1
gr
1
 
ðmod qÞ ð7Þ
Step 3. Recover the messagem ¼ ½fk2  F2ð½f
k1Þ ð8Þ
Step 4. Check if½fk1 ¼ F1ðmÞ ð9Þ
If it holds, then this signature is accepted and the system
outputs the message m. Otherwise, the system outputs false.
5.6. Private key evolution
To reduce the damage caused by private key exposure, the life-
time of EBAA is divided into N distinct time periods: 1,2,. . .,N
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one day), and the private key evolves over time. For period
i 2 {1,2,. . .,N}, the private key can be computed as
SKIDB jji ¼ ðsþH1ðIDBÞjjðdþ iTÞÞ1P ð10Þ
where d is the initial date and T is the length of the period.
Therefore, SKIDB jji can only be used within period i. Normally,
at the end of period i, PKG issues the private key of next per-
iod SKIDB jjðiþ1Þ.
Usually, PKG issues only one private key for the current
period through a secure channel. As we know, maintaining a
secure channel is costly. Hence, we consider the issuing of
private keys in the batch manner where PKG issues the next
n private keys all at one time. In this case, it is important to
set a proper number n. The number can be set small to alle-
viate the damage which may be caused by private key expo-
sure. However, a small n implies an increase in the total
communication cost. Here, we propose the following proce-
dure of adaptive private key evolving. Let nB denote the num-
ber of private keys which the broadcaster wants to apply
once. Let mB denote the maximum of nB. PKG can adap-
tively adjust mB according to the security level and efﬁciency.
The private key evolving can be performed by the following
steps:
Step 1. At period i, according to the security requirement,
the broadcaster B determines the value of nB.
Step 2. B sends nB to PKG through a secure channel.
Step 3. After receiving nB, PKG ﬁrstly sets n to be the smal-
ler value of nB and mB, generates n private keys x, and
sends x back to B through the secure channel. x is set asx ¼ SKIDB jjðiþ1Þ; SKIDB jjðiþ2Þ;    ; SKIDB jjðiþnÞ
  ð11Þ
Step 4. B stores x secretly and deletes previous processing
information for security, as suggested in Ref.216. Security analysis
In this section, we give a security analysis for EBAA.
6.1. Consistency
Theorem 1. The signature for the broadcast message is
consistent.
Proof. The consistence of the scheme is justiﬁed as follows.
e^ðU;VÞr1gr1
¼ e^ðð1þ rlÞSKIDB ;Qpub þH1ðIDBÞQÞr
1
gr
1
¼ e^ðð1þ rlÞðsþH1ðIDBÞÞ1P; sQþH1ðIDBÞQÞr
1
gr
1
¼ e^ðð1þ rlÞP;QÞr1gr1
¼ e^ðP;QÞðr1þlÞe^ðP;QÞr1
¼ e^ðP;QÞl
¼ v
ð12Þ
Hence, we obtainrH2ðe^ðU;VÞr
1
gr
1Þ ðmod qÞ
¼ rH2ðvÞ ðmod qÞ
¼ f
ð13Þ
In this way, a recipient can recover the message m from f:
m ¼ ½fk2  F2ð½f
k1Þ. Since f= F1(m)||F2(F1(m))¯m according
to Eq. (4), the recipient can easily check if ½fk1 ¼ F1ðmÞ holds.
Finally, the integrity of m is justiﬁed as
½F1ðmÞ ðF2ðF1ðmÞÞk mÞk2  F2ðF1ðmÞÞ
¼ F2ðF1ðmÞÞ m F2ðF1ðmÞÞ ¼ m
ð14Þ
h6.2. Unforgeability
Theorem 2. The signature for the broadcast message is existen-
tially unforgeable under a chosen message attack in the random
oracle model, assuming the hardness of a co-DHI problem.
Proof. The proof is essentially similar to that of the ZSM
scheme,9 and thus here we only give a proof sketch brieﬂy.
At ﬁrst, let A be a probabilistic polynomial time adversary,
which can succeed in existential forgery with non-negligible
advantage on the signature of the broadcast message in EBAA.
Then there is an algorithm B that solves the co-DHI problem
with non-negligible advantage.
Given Q,aQ 2 G2 where s is a random number in Zq, B’s
goal is to compute s1P. To this end, algorithm B simulates the
challenger and interacts with A as follows.
To begin with, B sets the system parameters {q,P, Q,G1,-
G2,GT,eˆ,Qpub,g,H1,H2,F1,F2}, where Qpub = sQ, and H1, H2,
F1, and F2 are random oracles controlled by B. Next,
algorithm B guesses that A will select a certain ID in the
challenge stage. Then, algorithm B runs A by giving A the
system parameters. During the execution, algorithm B emu-
lates A’s oracles in a way similar to that in Ref.9 Finally, with a
non-negligible probability, A outputs a signature (r,U) for the
message m and ID.
Then, algorithm B restarts and runs the above game for a
second time. By using the Forking Lemma,22 with a non-
negligible probability, algorithm B obtains two different
signatures (r,U) and (r0,U0) for the same message m and ID.
As a result, B gets s1P = (r  r0)-1(U  U0), which is the
solution of the co-DHI problem. However, according to
assumption, there is no probabilistic polynomial time algo-
rithm to solve the co-DHI problem with non-negligible
advantage. Therefore, the above contradiction means the
unforgeability of the broadcast message. h6.3. Independence
Theorem 3. EBAA achieves the key independence for the
evolution of broadcasters’ private keys.
Proof. In the private key evolution phase, the broadcaster B
ﬁrstly sends nB to PKG through a secure channel. Then
according to nB provided by B, PKG generates the set of
Table 2 Security level comparison.
Security level Chen 7 Pan et al.8 EBAA
ADS-B authentication
p p p
Without certiﬁcate
p p
Without encryption
p p
Key evolution
p
Message recovery
p
Fig. 4 UAT data composition of new type 30.
694 H. Yang et al.private keys x and further sends x to B through the secure
channel. Thus, even if an adversary eavesdrops the communi-
cation between B and PKG, it cannot get any information
about x. On the other hand, even if an adversary compro-
mises any previous private key, it cannot deduce current or
future private keys since the discrete logarithm problem
ensures the private keys’ security.19 Hence, the key indepen-
dence for the evolution of broadcasters’ private keys can be
achieved in EBAA. h
Finally, we present the comparison of the security level in
Table 2.
7. Performance evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of EBAA in terms
of computation cost and communication overhead. To begin
with, we provide the general performance evaluation of IBS
schemes. Then, we compare the transmission overheads in
EBAA and the scheme in Ref.8, which uses the certiﬁcate-
based signature (ECDSA and X.509). Finally, based on the
simulation experiments, we evaluate the computation cost of
EBAA.
7.1. Performance evaluation in general
In Table 3, we compare the general performances of ﬁve
IBS schemes in terms of total transmission length (|signature|
+|message|) and computation costs which are required in sign-
ing and verifying. Here, we denote a pairing operation, an
elliptic curve scalar multiplication in G1, an exponential oper-
ation in GT, and a map-to-point hash function H:
{0,1}*ﬁ G123 by Pa, M, Exp, and H, respectively. Other oper-
ations are neglected here, as their computation costs are very
small, compared with the ones mentioned above.
As shown in Table 3, ﬁrst of all, the communication over-
heads (i.e., the total length) required in EBAA and ZSM9
are the same, which are smaller than those of the other three
schemes. This is because messages in the two schemes can both
be recovered from signatures. Hence, the two schemes are
more suitable to the low-band communication environmentTable 3 General performance evaluation.
Scheme Sign Verify Total length
Hess12 1Exp + 2M 2Pa + 1Exp + 1H |m|+|q|+|G1|
Yi13 3M 2Pa + 2Exp + 1M |m|+2|G1|
Cha et al.14 2H+ 1M 2Pa + 2H+ 1M |m|+2|G1|
Zhang et al.9 1Exp + 2M 2Pa + 1Exp + 1H |q|+|G1|
EBAA 1Exp + 1M 1Pa + 1Exp + 1M |q|+|G1|of ADS-B. Furthermore, compared with Zhang et al.,9 EBAA
improves the computational cost by 1M in signing and 1Pa in
verifying, which is better suited for resource-constrained avi-
onics devices.
7.2. Communication cost comparison
Then we compare the transmission overheads in EBAA and
the scheme in Ref.8. For convenience, we consider the security
level of 1024-bit RSA signatures as a criterion.
In Ref.8, in order to broadcast a signed short message
(|m| = k2), four UAT data frames are necessary since there
is only 240-bit data space that can be used in a UAT. As a
result, for every signed broadcast message, the total length of
‘‘|signature| + |message|’’ is 960 bits, while in EBAA the total
length is only 341 bits. This is because the total length of
EBAA is |q|+|G1|. If the security level with 1024-bit RSA is
required, q should be a 170-bit prime, and G1 should be a
group in which every element is of 171-bit length by using
any of the families of curves described in Ref.23. Consequently,
two UAT data frames are enough to broadcast a signed short
message (Fig. 4).
Fig. 5 plots the communication overhead with the number
of broadcast messages. As shown in Fig. 5, the total length in
EBAA is much shorter than that in Ref.8. Therefore, it is more
suitable for low-bandwidth communication environments of
ADS-B data link. Note that the comparison does not consider
the transmission of certiﬁcates. In that case, EBAA has much
better advantages due to the inherent portability of identity-
based setting.Fig. 5 Comparison of communication overhead.
Table 4 Computation time estimation of EBAA.
CPU frequency(MHZ) Tinit(ms) Treg(ms) Tsig(ms) Tvrf(ms)
200 609.6896 43.6453 65.5974 629.2988
400 284.6346 20.7722 31.0010 294.0442
800 139.1469 10.8369 15.5195 144.1214
1000 111.8340 7.6892 12.8203 115.4903
1440 78.5756 6.2214 9.1426 80.4287
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Considering the computation cost, we focused on the run-
ning time simulation for main phases of EBAA. Firstly,
experiments were conducted on an ARMv7 microprocessor
with frequencies from 200 MHz to 1440 MHz and memory
with a 256 M RAM to study the execution time. Then,
we used the MIRACL library (version 5.6.1)24 to implement
cryptographic operations, where R-ate pairing on a Barreto-
Naehrig curve (embedding degree K= 12) with a 1-2-4-12
tower of extensions was used.25 Note that EBAA works
with type-3 pairings, which are much more efﬁcient in
practice than type-1 pairings. The computation times of
the following phases are summarized in Table 4 where we
denote the average execution times of system initialization,
broadcaster registration, messages signing and broadcast,
and veriﬁcation and recovery byTinit, Treg, Tsig, and Tvrf,
respectively.
As shown in Table 4, for the typical setting, EBAA is com-
putationally-efﬁcient. Hence, EBAA is well suited for avionics
devices with limited resources in practice.
8. Conclusions
In this paper, we have proposed an efﬁcient broadcast
authentication scheme for ADS-B based on IBS-MR. The
security analysis demonstrates that our scheme can achieve
authenticity and integrity for ADS-B broadcast messages,
and adaptive evolution of broadcasters’ private keys. The
performance evaluation shows that there are two advantages
in the proposed scheme. One is that the proposed scheme is
computationally efﬁcient for typical avionics devices with
limited resources. The other is that the proposed scheme is
suitable for low-bandwidth ADS-B data link because it has
low communication overhead. In the future work, we will
explore other challenging security issues in ADS-B data link
communications, such as the privacy concerns of general
aviation aircraft and so on. In addition, we will design a
simulation system to test the authentication for ADS-B
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